Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

12-27-1951

Estate of Harootenian [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Estates and Trusts
Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Estate of Harootenian [DISSENT]" (1951). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 397.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/397

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

242

EsTATE OF HAROOTENIAN

[38 C.2d

majority opinion that a trust that continues beyond the
statutory period must always fail are not justified under the
Civil Code and should be disapproved or overruled. Of
course, if restrictions in the trust instrument prevent transfer
of an absolute interest in possession, alienation is restrained
in violation of the statute. But when, as here, the interests
vest at the expiration of a life in being at the time of creation
of the trust, and the settlor has not restrained the beneficiaries' power of alienation by means of a spendthrift clause,
there is no restraint on alienation.
Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
17, 1952.

[S. F. No. 18116.

In Bank.

Dec. 27, 1951.]

Estate of KAZAR HAROOTENIAN, Deceased. GEORGE
HAROOTENIAN, as Executor, etc., Proponent and
Respondent, v. SYBLE JANIGAN et al., Contestants
and Respondents; JEAN HAROOTENIAN, Intervener
and Appellant.
[1] Wills-Appeal-Judgments Appealable.-An appeal lies from
a judgment of dismissal following the final order in proceedings to revoke probate of a will. (Pro b. Code, § 1240; Code
Civ. Proc., § 963.)
[2a, 2b] !d.-Contest-Intervention.-It is immaterial that intervention in a pending timely-filed will contest occurs after the
statute of limitations has run. (Pro b. Code, §§ 380, 1233;
Code Civ. Proc., § 387.)
[3] !d.-Contest-Who May Institute-Beneficiaries Under Prior
Will.-A prima facie cause entitling petitioner to contest a
probated will is stated in a petition to revoke probate alleging
that he is a legatee under a prior will.
[4] Id.-Contest-Intervention.-Where a will contest is unadjudicated when an intervention is filed, the court has jurisdiction to try all the issues on behalf of all the parties and
does not lose it merely by reason that pursuant to the court's
[3] See 26 Cal.Jur. 1082; 57 Am.Jur. 541.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, §548; [2,4] Wills, §495; [3]
Wills, § 483(4); [5] Equity, § 37(3); [6] Wills, § 483(6).
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control of order of proof the original contestant's interest is
deemed insufficient before a complete trial on all issues in
behalf of all parties is had.
[5] Equity-Laches.-A plea that an mtervener in a will contest
was guilty of laches in filing her complaint is not sustained
where no change affecting the parties' legal rights or any
financial loss is asserted to have resulted from the delay in
filing.
[6] Wills- Contest- Who May Institute- Creditors.-A disinhei·ited heir's judgment creditor who has perfected a lien when
the ancestor's real property would devolve to the heir if the
ancestor's will were set aside has an interest in the devolution
which makes him an interested person who may contest the
will.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno
County. Ernest Klette, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Will contest. Judgment of dismissal after order sustaining
demurrer to, and order granting motion to dismiss, an amended
complaint in intervention, reversed with directions.
Philander Brooks Beadle and Morton L. Silvers for Intervener and .Appellant.
Leon .A. Blum, David E. Peckinpah and L. N. Barber for
Respondents.
SHENK, J.-[1] This is an appeal from a judgment of
dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer to and an
order granting a motion to dismiss an amended complaint in
intervention in a will contest. The judgment followed the
final order in proceedings to revoke the probate of the will
and is appealable. (Prob. Code, § 1240; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 963; Estate of Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 583 [150 P. 989]; Estate
of Katz, 49 Cal.App.2d 82 [120 P.2d 896] .)
The record shows the following : Kazar Harootenian, a
widower, died on March 3, 1947. A brief instrument designated as his last will and testament was dated February 27,
1947. It mentioned his four adult children, George, Samuel,
.Agnes and Syble. They survived the decedent. The decedent bequeathed $1,500 to the son Samuel, all the rest of his
estate to the daughter Agnes, and expressly disinherited
George and Syble. George was named executor without
bond and with power to dispose of the property without order

244

EsTATE OF HAROOTENIAN

[38 C.2d

of court. Some illegible marks or writing appeared with the
decedent's name at the end of the will followed by an attestation clause subscribed by two witnesses.
On March 24, 1947, George filed a petition for probate of
the will and for letters testamentary. On April 5th Samuel
and Syble filed a contest resisting the probate of the will on
the grounds that the instrument was not signed by the decedent but by another; that the formalities of execution were
not complied with; that the decedent was then suffering from
a broken spine, fractures and contusions, was confined to bed
in a hospital, was physically helpless, feeble and infirm in
mind and body, and was not of sound and disposing mind ;
that the attempted signing of the instrument was not his free
and voluntary act but was procured by the undue influence
of George and Agnes with the intent to obtain the greater
part of the estate for themselves. George and Agnes filed an
answer to the contest admitting the alleged physical condition of the decedent but denied other allegations. On May
9, 1947, the contest was withdrawn and dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to a stipulation and agreement among
all the heirs. Thereby Samuel remitted the bequest which
became a part of the residue. Agnes as residuary legatee
agreed to the distribution to Samuel and Syble jointly of a
one-half interest in the Harootenian ranch property in Fresno
County, or one half the proceeds of the sale thereof, and all
agreed that the ranch be sold as soon as possible. Assets of
the estate were listed as the ranch property, an apartment
house in San Mateo County, a bank account of approximately
$8,600, furniture and personal belongings. Property thereafter discovered was to be divided one half jointly to Samuel
and Syble, the other half to Agnes. The attorneys acting
for Samuel and Syble were nominated to act for George in the
sale of the ranch.
Upon the filing of the agreement and on May 12, 1947,
the court admitted the will to probate and appointed George
as executor. On November 19, 1947, George tendered his resignation dated in Nevada because of his removal to that state,
and Agnes and Syble were appointed administratices with the
will annexed.
Within the six months' limitation period of section 380 of
the Probate Code, and on November 10, 1947, Haig Harootenian, minor son of George and Jean Harootenian, through the
latter as his guardian ad litem, filed a contest of the will and a
petition to revoke probate. The contestant alleged that he
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was a legatee under a prior valid will of the decedent; that
the prior will was left in the possession and custody of George
and Agnes who concealed the instrument, that the will admitted to probate was not the will of the decedent, was not
executed in accordance with the required formalities, and was
otherwise invalid on the same grounds as alleged in the contest of Samuel and Syble. George, Agnes, Samuel and Syble
filed an answer containing denials of all allegations with the
exception that they admitted the relationship and that at the
time of the execution of the probated will the decedent was
suffering from a broken spine, fractures and contusions and
was confined to bed in a hospital.
On March 28, 1949, by leave of court, a complaint in intervention on the same grounds of contest was filed by Jean
Harootenian as a judgment creditor of George. On April
5, 1949, the trial commenced. At the close of the contestant
Haig's evidence as to the existence of the alleged prior concealed will, the proponents moved to dismiss on the ground
that the evidence was insufficient to support Haig's claim of
interest, namely, that there was a prior will in which he was
named as legatee. The motion to dismiss Haig's contest was
granted and the order thereon entered on April 16, 1949.
The amended complaint in intervention was filed by leave
of court on August 8, 1949. Proponents filed a demurrer
thereto and moved for dismissal on the grounds that there
was not pending a contest in which the contestant could intervene and that the intervention was barred by the time
limitation of section 380 of the Probate Code. As first indicated herein the trial court sustained the demurrer, granted
the motion, and dismissed the proceedings in intervention.
[2a] The first question is whether the complaint in intervention was filed within the six months' limitation of section
380 of the Probate Code. There is no question as to the timely
filing of the contest initiated by Haig as an alleged legatee
under a prior will. Nor may it be questioned that the allegations of Haig's petition showed him to be an interested person who may contest the validity of the will. [3] The
pleadings filed by him alleged a prima facie cause entitling
him to contest the probated will as a legatee under a prior
will. (Estate of Lancl, 166 Cal. 538 [137 P. 246] ; Estate of
Pla~d, 27 Cal.2d 424 [164 P.2d 765, 162 A.L.R. 837] .)
It is the settled law of this state that an interested person
may intervene on the same grounds of contest at any time

246

EsTATE OF HARf"YrE::>riAN

[38 C.2d

before the trial of a pending proceeding to revoke probate
of the will initiated by another interested person. A will
contest is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. [2b] It is immaterial that the intervention in a pending timely contest
occurs after the lapse of the limited period, and the party's
voluntary dismissal of the pending contest will not affect the
right of the intervener to a trial on the issues raised by him.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 387; Pro b. Code, § 1233; Voyce v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal.2d 479 [127 P.2d 536]; Estate of Butzow, 21
Cal.App.2d 96 [68 P.2d 374] .) The proponents do not
seriously question these principles, but contend that they
are inapplicable because on the trial Haig· was unable to
produce sufficient evidence of the existence of the alleged
prior will and his contest was dismissed for failure to prove
his interest. Thus the dismissal was not a voluntary dismissal by the party but was a dismissal by the court after
trial on the merits of the preliminary issue. A voluntary dismissal by a party will not be permitted to defeat the statutory right of intervention by preventing trial on the grounds
of the contest. But to give the claimed effect to the court's
judgment of dismissal would likewise nullify the statutory
right. That right inheres at any time before trial. An intervention which is timely and proper before trial cannot
be defeated after trial by the finding on an issue which does
not dispose of the merits of the issues tendered by the intervener. If the contestant by a voluntary dismissal may not
defeat the intervener's right to a trial of the cause, there
is likewise no reason why a dismissal entered by the court
should have that adverse effect, and the proponents present
no case in point so declaring. In the only case relied on the
noninterest of the original contestant was shown on the face
of the pleadings. (See Russell v. Nelson, 317 Mo. 148 [295
S.W. 118] .) That case is distinguishable for that reason.
The policy underlying the rule that the dismissal of the
cause as to one party will not affect the rights of a party not
yet heard is that which permits all persons entitled to a hearing to have their day in court. True the court does not
have jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding to revoke probate
which is barred by the time limitation, and will be restrained
from exercising jurisdiction in such a case. (Estate of Smith,
214 Cal. 50 [3 P.2d 921]; Scott v. Superior Court, 125 Cal.
App. 513, 516 [14 P.2d 99].) [4] But that is not to say
that when jurisdiction once attaches the court may be halted
before all parties are heard because pursuant to its discretion
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relating to the order of proof ( cf. Estate of Land, 166 Cal.
538, 540 [137 P. 246] ), the original contestant's evidence
on the issue of his interest was deemed insufficient. The court
did not lose jurisdiction of the entire contest and other parties by the dismissal of one, the original contestant, on a
partial trial. The contest was unadjudicated at the time the
intervention was :filed and the court had jurisdiction to try
all of the issues of the contest on behalf of all the parties
before it, in whatever order of proof it might specify. That
jurisdiction continued until the entire controversy was :finally
disposed of as to all of the contestants. It follows that
the judgment or dismissal of the complaint in intervention
is insupportable on the ground of the alleged bar of section 380
of the Probate Code.
[5] The pleadings disclose that the plea of laches interposed by demurrer and motion is also unavailing. Nothing is
thus shown by which the rights of the proponents could be
prejudiced on account of the delay in filing the complaint
in intervention. The lapse of time alone is not sufficient to
support the plea. No change affecting the legal rights of the
p~rties nor any :financial loss is indicated. No circumstances
or facts are alleged which would sustain the judgment of
dismissal on that ground. ( CaMll v. Superior Court, 145
Cal. 42, 47 [78 P. 467]; Thornton v. Middletown Educational
Corp., 21 Cal.App.2d 707, 711 [70 P.2d 234] .) The intervener is therefore entitled to a trial on the merits of the contest if she is an interested person who may contest the will.
It is also alleged that prior to the events hereinabove related, George and Jean, the parents of Haig, had been separated, that the wife had been awarded support by court
decree, and that on January 27, 1947, which was prior to the
death of George's father, Jean obtained a judgment against
George for unpaid support. An execution which issued in
March, 1949, indicated that there was then due on the judgment $8,668.82.
Section 370 of the Probate Code provides that before probate "any person interested" may contest the will. Section
380 provides that ''any interested person'' other than a party
to a contest before probate and a person who had actual notice of such previous contest in time to have joined therein,
may contest the will at any time within six months after probate. The proponents do not contend that the order on the
demurrer or on the .motion to dismiss is supported on the
ground that the intervener had actual notice of or oppor-
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tunity to participate in the short-lived contest before probate.
The question then is whether a judgment creditor of a disinherited heir of the decedent is a person interested within
the meaning of the sections. That question does not appear
to have been directly involved in previous cases in this state.
It has been declared as settled that an interested person is one who has an interest of a pecuniary nature which
may be impaired or defeated by the probate of the will or
benefited by setting it aside. (Estate of Platd, supra, 27 Cal.
2d 424, 425-426.) The interest is not necessarily confined to that of an heir who would take by succession if the
will be set aside. In Estate of Plaut and in Estate of Land
(supra, 166 Cal. 538), it was recognized that a legatee under
a prior will, not an heir, was a person who might be benefited by setting aside the will. Nor is it necessary that
the impairment or benefit be established as a certainty. A
prima facie showing of an interest is enough. (Estate of
Plaut, supra, 27 Cal.2d at pp. 427-428.) However, a remote possibility of escheat is insufficient to support a claim
of interest by the state. (State v. Superior Court, 148 Cal.
55 [82 P. 672, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 643] .) Nor is a debtor of the
estate a person whose pecuniary interest would be affected
by the probate of the will. (Estate of B1:ly, 96 Cal.App.2d 333
[215 P.2d 78, 15 A.L.R.2d 861] .)
In Sparks v. De la Guerra, 14 Cal. 108, 18 Cal. 676, the
plaintiff, a judgment creditor of an heir, by actions against
the executors, unsuccessfully attempted to reach the assets
of an alleged secret trust created in the executors for the
benefit of the heir. The cases did not involve a contest of the
will.
In San Diego Trust etc. Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal.App.
675 [10 P.2d 158], the testatrix created a spendthrift trust
for her son, obviously to protect him from a judgment held by
his wife. Execution issued and was levied on the assets in
possession of the executor-trustee. The latter filed an action
for declaratory relief to determine whether the wife could
satisfy the judgment from the trust property. By answer
filed more than six months after probate the wife sought to
attack the will as invalid on various grounds. On her appeal
from an adverse judgment on the pleadings it was correctly
determined that the answer as an attack on the validity of the
will was too late. The court also stated that since the wife
was not an heir of the deceased nor a legatee under the will,
she was a mere stranger, not entitled to notice of the probate
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proceedings, and therefore not an interested person, citing
State v. Superior Court, supra (148 Cal. 55). The question
of the pecuniary interest of a judgment creditor of the heir
was not considered.
Authorities with little conflict agree that a general creditor of a disinherited heir has not sufficient interest to contest the will; that there must have been created some right
or interest in the creditor which will attach to the property
on devolution to the heir if the will be invalid. The authorities are divided as to whether a judgment creditor of the heir
has such an interest. None questions that a parent has
the right to make a valid will disinheriting a child. But if
through fraud or undue influence or other circumstance the
will is not the product of the mind of the putative testator.
or is not a validly executed will a judgment lien creditor of
the disinherited heir is in the majority of the cases held to be
a person who has a pecuniary interest which will be impaired
by admitting the instrument to probate or be benefited by
setting aside the probate thereof.
In Bloor v. Platt ( 1908), 78 Ohio St. 46 [ 84 N.E. 604, 14
Ann. Cas. 332], it was stated that a lien creditor could not
with justice or reason be denied his day in court to prove that
a paper purporting to be a will and obviously designed to defeat creditors of the heir is not in fact a valid testament. It
was held that "any interested person" meant interested persons in addition to devisees, legatees, heirs, executors and administrators, and included any person who has such a direct,
immediate and legally ascertained pecuniary interest in the
devolution of the estate as would be impaired or defeated by
the probate of the will or be benefited by setting it aside, and
that a judgment creditor was such a person. That and other
cases establish the distinction between the right of contest of
a general creditor of an heir who has no vested right, claim
or interest to be defeated or established by the probate or
rejection of the will, and the right of a judgment lien creditor
who generally is entitled to assail or defend against anything
that may divest his lien. Although the lien creditor has
no interest in the estate of the decedent as such, his lien
attaches the moment title is vested in the heir by descent.
It is not interest in the estate as such which determines his
right. [6] It is his interest in the devolution of the estate which
establishes the right of contest. In In re Duffy's Estate
(1940), 228 Iowa 426 [292 N.W. 165, 167, 128 A.L.R. 943], it
was pointed out that if the common law still prevailed, in
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ejectment a lien creditor could defeat a title under an invalid
will; and that there should exist no good reason why he could
not do so under the statutory proceeding. After reviewing
numerous conflicting cases the court held the lien creditor to
be a person interested in accord with what was deemed the
weight of authority. The common law method of contest
available to a judgment creditor of an heir was also noted
in Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333 [48 S.W. 478, 69 Am.St.
Rep. 615], where it was held that a lien creditor of the heir
was entitled to contest a will disinheriting the heir since there
was no difference in principle between the right of the heir
and that of his judgment creditor. In Smith v. Bradstreet
(1833), 16 Pick. (Mass.) 264, it was also said that the interests
of the heir and his judgment creditor in the probate of the
will were identical. As observed in In re Van Doren's Estate (1935), 119 N.J.Eq. 80 [180 A. 841], obviously it could
not be said that a judgment creditor of an heir would not
be injured by the probate of an invalid will disinheriting the
heir.
In 68 Corpus Juris 906, the general rule with citation of
cases is stated as above, viz : that the creditor of the heir has
not such an interest as will entitle him to contest the will except where he is an attachment or judgment creditor whose
lien will attach when title vests in the heir. In 57 American
Jurisprudence, p. 551, it is stated that the well-considered
cases hold that a judgment creditor of an heir has a sufficient
interest to contest a will under which the heir is to take
nothing, if the judgment lien would attach on the property's
passing under the laws of succession. (See, also, cases collected in notes 46 A.L.R. 1490 and 128 A.L.R. 963.)
It follows from the foregoing authorities and the statutes
giving "any interested person" the right of contest, that a
judgment creditor who has perfected a lien at the time the
property would devolve to the heir if the will be set aside is an
interested person who may contest the will.
The record on this appeal shows that if the will be held invalid there is real property, title to which would pass by devolution under the laws of succession. A judgment lien may
be established on the real property of a judgment debtor by
filing an abstract of the judgment or decree "with the recorder of any county and from such recording the judgment
or decree becomes a lien upon all the real property of the
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in such county,
owned by him at the time, or which he may afterwards and
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before the lien expires, acquire." (Code Civ. Pro c., § 674.)
Under the laws of succession the title to real property devolves
on the heirs at law as of the time of the death of the decedent. (Prob. Code, § 300.) The contestant alleged generally
that she was a judgment creditor of the disinherited heir at
the time of the death of the decedent. The motion to dismiss
was made on the grounds that there was no contest pending in
which the contestant could intervene and that the complaint in
intervention was filed too late. That motion was granted. The
dismissal on the stated grounds foreclosed the request for permission to allege by amendment additional f~J,cts relating to the
specific lien required to bring the contestant within the class declared to be interested persons who might contest the will. The
absence of such request is deemed not to affect the proper judgment of this court based on the conclusion that the trial court
erred in dismiss;ng the complaint in intervention. The cause
should be reinstated with an opportunity to the plaintiff by
amendment to bring herself, if she can do so, within the class
of judgment lien creditors entitled to contest a will disinheriting a judgment debtor.
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Schauer, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal but
do not agree with the reasoning in the majority opinion that
the right of a creditor of an heir to contest a will is limited
to a judgment creditor whose judgment may be a lien upon
real property which would descend to the heir in case the will
is set aside.
The question of whether a creditor of an heir may contest
a will of the testator was settled recently by this court in
Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal.2d 807 [108 P.2d 401, 133 A.L.R. 1424],
a case which is not mentioned in the majority opinion. There
we were considering whether the creditor of a legatee under
a will could prevent the renunciation of the legacy by the
legatee. We held he could and in so doing held that the case
was analogous to a contest of a will by a creditor of an heir,
stating (p. 814): "A creditor who is legally entitled to set
aside a fra.udulent conveyance may exercise the debtor's right
to contest a will even though the debtor himself does not wish
to do so. (Brooks v. Paine, 123 Ky. 271 [90 S.W. 600] ; In
re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429 [47 N.W. 1133]; Bloor v.
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Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46 [84 N.E. 605, 14 Ann. Cas. 332] .) If the
creditor contested the will successfully it would be ironic
to leave the debtor free to renounce the ensuing benefits. A
debtor may be compelled not only to retain his property for
the benefit of his creditors, but to dispose of it for the same
purpose. There is a like obligation upon him of which he may
acquit himself without hardship, to avail himself of a bequest.
The denial to the debtor of the right to renounce as against
his creditors in fact benefits his own economic interests as
well as those of his creditors." (Italics added.) It will
be noted in the foregoing that a creditor who is legally entitled to set aside a fraudulent conveyance may contest a will.
In the forepart of the opinion it is stated that under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (Civ. Code,§§ 3439-3440.5)
the creditor who may set aside a fraudulent transfer need not
be a judgment creditor nor have a lien. It follows, therefore,
that, contrary to the majority opinion, a general creditor
may contest a will. Furthermore, it will be noted that the
Kalt case cites Brooks v. Paine, 123 Ky. 271 [90 S.W. 600],
for its statement to this effect. It was there held that a general creditor of an heir may contest a will which disinherits
the heir.
I can see no justification for requiring that the judgment
creditor of an heir must have a lien on real property before
he can contest the will, thus placing personal property beyond
his reach. There may be policy reasons for requiring that
the creditor have a judgment, such as, that the probate court
is an inappropriate forum to litigate the question of whether
the creditor is in fact such, and the heir, his alleged debtor,
is not a party to the contest proceeding. There is no reason,
however, for the lien requirement. The lien is tenuous at
the best as it may be wiped out if the property is sold during
probate.
Finally, the holding by the majority can be made meaningless by simple action by the creditor. The right to contest
a will being a chose in action, is transferable. (Estate of
Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 586 [150 P. 989] ; Estate of Clark, 94
Cal.App. 453 [271 P. 542] .) It would appear, therefore, that
a creditor may commence an action against the heir and attach his right to contest the will (Code Civ. Proc., § 542 [b])
which would be substantially the same as a lien.
I would therefore hold that both a judgment creditor and
a creditor of an heir who has brought an action and effected
a valid attachment of the interest of the heir in his share of
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the assets of an estate has such an interest that he may contest a will which is so drawn as to deprive an heir of property
that would have descended to him in the event of intestacy.
Traynor, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-Courts have expressed many divergent
conclusions in determining the "interest" which one must
have to give him the right to contest a will. In my opinion,
to allow either a creditor or a judgment creditor of a disinherited heir to maintain such a contest, places an obstacle
in the way of the prompt settlement of estates which cannot
be justified upon any sound legal principle.
A will contest is entirely the creature of statute. The sole
standard established by the Legislature to determine the
necessary qualifications of the person who may contest the
probate of a will is stated in two phrases in the Probate Code.
Section 370 permits ''any person interested'' to contest the
will before probate. Section 380 allows ''any interested person" to maintain a contest after probate if he has had no
notice of a prior proceeding. No standard could be more
vague and lacking in definition. What sort of interest must
there be, and in what~
The Legislature might well have used the word in the sense
of a property right. Or did it limit the proceeding to a person with an expectation of pecuniary benefit 1 Giving effect
to a broader connotation of the term, should it be construed as
authorizing legal action by one who believes that the testator
did not follow the highest moral principles in making provision for the devolution of his property~ By common definition, interest in an estate, without qualification of the term,
may mean almost anything. It could include the motivation
of one of asserted good purpose having no relationship to the
deceased, nor the possibility of sharing in the estate, who believes that the property should be divided differently than the
will specifies.
Depending upon the phase of the law in which it is used,
''interest'' or ''interested'' assumes a multitude of meanings.
''The word 'interest' is used throughout the Restatement of
this Subject to denote the object of any human desire." (Restatement of Torts, § 1.) ''The word 'interest' is used in the
Restatement of this Subject both generically to include varying aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and immunities
and distributively to mean any one of them. The creation of
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interests may be either the creation of a new interest or the
change or abolition of an existing interest." (Restatement
of Conflict of Laws, § 42b.)
''In its ordinary signification among men of all classes
. . . [the word 'interest'] is broad enough to include any
right, title, or estate in, or lien upon real estate. One who
holds a mortgage upon a piece of land for half its value is
commonly and truthfully said to be interested, to have an
interest in it . . . . " (Or'msby v. Ottman, 29 C.C.A.. 295 [85
F. 492, 497] .) Definitions of "interest" or "interested"
could be multiplied seemingly without end. (See 22 Words
and Phrases p. 38 et seq.; Black's Law Dictionary [3d ed.,
1933] 996; Ballentine's Law Dictionary [1930] 670.)
Even when applied to the comparatively narrow field of
probate of an estate, the term has been given a variety of
meanings. "It is an elementary proposition that the only
persons authorized to contest or seek revocation of the probate
of a will are those who, but for the will, would succeed in some
degree to the decedent's estate." (In re Pepin's Estate,
53 Mont. 240 [163 P. 104, 105] .) A. purchaser of an interest
in the lands of the decedent was held to be a person interested
in the estate. (McCarthy v. Texas Co., (Tex.Civ.A.pp.) 235
S.W. 679, 681.) An administrator de bonis non is a party
interested in the estate. (Balch v. Hooper, 32 Minn. 158
[20 N.W.124, 125].)
"The word 'interest', in its ordinary, accepted meaning,
embracE's both a vested and a contingent interest and the
word 'interested' is defined as 'having an interest ; having
a share or concern in some project or affair; involved; liable
to be affected or prejudiced; . . . not disinterested. . . . ' ''
(In re Brown's Estate, 24 Cal.A.pp.2d 573, 575 [75 P.2d
658].) ''A. 'person interested', within the contemplation of
this statute, undoubtedly means a person who has such a
direct pecuniary interest in the devolution of the testator's
estate as would be impaired or defeated by the will, or be
benefited by setting it aside." (Chilcote v. II offrnan, 97 Ohio
St. 98 [119 N.E. 364, 366, L.R.A.. 1918D 575].)
'l'he standard adopted by Mr. Justice Shenk is that "It is
his interest in the devolution of the estate which establishes
the right of contest." But with the restriction that the cont"stant must be one having a judgment lien, this means that,
if the contest is successful, and i.f the real estate distributable
to the debtor has not been sold during administration, and if
that real estate is finally distributed to the debtor, the cred-
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itor then will have a property interest in the estate of the
decedent. The qualification to maintain the proceeding can
be determined only after a successful contest of the will and
at the time the estate is ready for distribution. Authority
to intrude upon the administration of an estate, with the consequent delays and unrecoverable expense, should not rest
upon such an uncertain basis.
A lien on the real property of a judgment debtor located
in a particular county may be obtained by recording an abstract of the judgment in that county. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 674.) But that right does not extend to one who has obtained his judgment in another state. And no lien is obtainable upon the personal property of a debtor. To allow one
to contest a will solely upon the ground that he is a judgment
creditor is wholly arbitrary and rests upon a construction of
''any interested person'' unjustified by fundamental principles governing probate procedure. The further requirement that the judgment must be a lien upon real property
which might be distributed to the heir, is a distinction which
has no rational basis in either probate law or the law governing creditors' rights.
Mr. Justice Shenk says "the interest is not necessarily confined to that of an heir who would take by succession if the
will be set aside.'' But in every California case cited by him,
the contestant was one who, upon a successful contest, would
take directly from the testator, either by the terms of a former
will or by succession.
In Estate of Land, 166 Cal. 538 (137 P. 246], the contestant
was a beneficiary under a former will. Even then, contest
was denied because the pleadings established that he stood
to gain no more under the former will than by the one he
attacked.
The contestant in Estate of Plant, 27 Cal.2d 424 [164 P.2d
765, 162 A.L.R. 837], was a beneficiary under a former will.
In Estate of Bily, 96 Cal.App.2d 333 [215 P.2d 78, 15 A.L.R.
2d 861], a debtor of the estate was denied the right to contest.
In San Diego Trust & Satrings Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal.
App. 675 [10 P.2d 158], the appellant stood in exactly the
same position as Jean Harootenian. Although the decision
was not based upon ''the pecuniary interest of a judgment
creditor of the heir,'' the court said:
''Appellant has no standing to contest the will because she
is not a party interested as specified by the code, section 370
of the Probate Code, formerly section 1307 of the Code of
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Civil Procedure. (See State v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 55
[82 P. 672, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 643].) If she could not contest the
will before probate, of course she could not afterward. Appellant was not an heir of deceased nor legatee under the
will. She was a mere stranger, and was not entitled to any
notice of the probate proceedings." (P. 681.)
The Heustis case cites with approval State v. Superior
Court, 148 Cal. 55 [82 P. 672, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 643], which was a
proceeding in mandamus to compel the superior court to permit the state to contest a will. The state claimed under a right
of escheat. It was held that the possibility of escheat was too
indirect an interest upon which to base a contest.
The right to contest a will is simply a cause of action to
invalidate a testamentary disposition which bars the contestant from sharing in the estate of the decedent. (Estate of
Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 585-586 [150 P. 989]; Estate of Clark,
94 Cal.App. 453, 461 [271 P. 542] ; Estate of Morrison, 125
Cal.App. 504, 507 [14 P.2d 102] ; Estate of Anthony, 127 Cal.
App. 186, 189 [15 P.2d 531].) I would construe "any interested person'' as meaning one who, if the will of the testator
were set aside, would receive directly, and not through any
third person, a part of the property of the estate. If the term
is to be more broadly applied, the Legislature should specifically define the qualifications of a contestant.
For these reasons, in my opinion, the judgment should be
affirmed.
Spence, J., concurred.

